I tried commenting before, but about half way through I had to run to catch a meeting and lost the comment.

I agree that the issue is whether we ‘ought’ to value people on the assumption that naturalism is true (not whether we would), but my criticism was based on the assumption that this was in fact what the issue was.

The reason I think there is a supernaturalistic fallacy is precisely because there’s an argument that in the case of ethics nothing that the natural can’t do the supernatural could do that doesn’t apply to the case of eternal life.

Anyway, I’m glad to see that someone’s reading the myth of the fjb. It’s all true, but you probably shouldn’t believe it. Any thoughts would be very much appreciated.

Best,
Clayton

Yeah, I’m aware of Singer’s work, and while I have nothing but respect for what he’s done on the animal rights front, I just can’t help but find the idea that animals are on some sort of a moral par with humans to be really, really implausible. Maybe I oughta work some of my thoughts up into a separate post; that might be interesting.

Regardless, I think my point still stands: I’d venture to say that many (if not, most) philosophers actually disagree with Singer and would argue that there’s something about human beings (e.g., greater degree of cognitive sophistication, introspective abilities, having been made in the image of God (according to Christian philosophers), etc.) that raises the moral stakes, as it were. (I’d also guess that just about all of the folk would disagree with him, especially when it comes to the issue of humans having sex with animals.)

This does not, of course, mean that Singer is wrong. My point was only that one of the ideas behind Bill Craig’s position — that humans are morally “special” sorts of things — is not one that is unique to Craig by any means (nor is it unique even to Christians).

you say

As I’m sure you’re aware, there have been plenty of moral philosophers throughout history who’ve suggested, in one way or another, that there’s just something about human persons that separates them, morally speaking, from the rest of the natural world. And I take this to be something about which most of the folk would agree.

Are you aware of Peter Singer’s work? he has spent his entire career trying to combat this (somewhat silly) notion that there is something special about human life…

Before I respond, I should note that I’m not entirely sure what lengths I’m willing to go to in order to defend Craig’s position here. I am a Christian, and since I’m relatively familiar with Craig’s work, I think I understand what it is that he’s trying to say, . . . although I agree with you that the way’s he’s chosen to say it is, well, less-than-admirable to say the least. So for whatever remains of this discussion, I’ll try just to defend Craig’s position in a (hopefully) better way.

As I’m sure you’re aware, there have been plenty of moral philosophers throughout history who’ve suggested, in one way or another, that there’s just something about human persons that separates them, morally speaking, from the rest of the natural world. And I take this to be something about which most of the folk would agree. We humans are “special” . . . somehow. And it’s not just that we’re more sophisticated than the rest of the natural world in terms of our physical characteristics. We possess a kind of inviolable value that is wholly independent of (i) our personal achievements, (ii) whatever relationships we might bear to others human beings, (iii) our physical characteristics, etc. So there is a sense in which Clayton Littlejohn, Ted Bundy, Paris Hilton, the mentally handicapped, and newborn babies are all equally valuable. And since it strikes many as extremely difficult (if possible at all) to nail down just what it is that all of those persons have in common (that gives them all this equal value), many just suppose that there’s something about personhood itself that is value-conferring. Persons are intrinsically valuable because they are persons, . . . or something like that.

And here, again, is where theists like Craig and non-theists like Michael Ruse and E. O. Wilson agree: This “intrinsic value of persons” that some philosophers (and probably most of the folk) think is needed to explain certain intuitions we have about morality and value is, at best, mysterious given only the explanatory resources of naturalism (and at worst, utterly ridiculous). And so, while Ruse and Wilson will go on to just deny that persons do, indeed, possess such value (contra the folk, I think), Craig will go the other way and insist (a) that we are intrinsically valuable and (b) that an explanation of how it is that we are so valuable will just have to go beyond the reach of naturalism.

What will such an explanation look like? Can’t really say. But I’d imagine that most Christian apologists/philosophers might here appeal to the theological notion of Man’s having been created in the image of God as a source of our moral uniqueness, i.e., personhood is only value-conferring because (a) God is a person and (b) it is in our personhood that we resemble him. Unfortunately, giving this idea its fair defense would involve traversing the line between philosophy and theology, something I’d rather not do right now.

Now, to your comments . . .

I do find Craig’s position to be repugnant. I do NOT think that his position is accepted by most theists. I know of very few theists who feel compelled to say that if naturalism were true, we’d be worthless. Most theists I know would say that a child produced by purely natural forces would be as deserving as love as a child produced by the hand of God.

I really just think that this is more a matter of a repugnant choice of words than anything else. Take, for instance, the reworded version of Craig’s argument posted by an anonymous visitor to your blog:

(1) Harming that cute baby is morally wrong. (everyone agrees)

(2) No natural facts about the badness of the baby’s being harmed are sufficient to make for the moral wrongness of harming that cute baby. (Here we could appeal to, e.g. Norcross on scalarity)

(3) So, if there is an explanation for the harming of the baby being wrong, that explanation must also appeal to supernatural facts.

(4) There is some explanation for the harming of the baby being morally wrong.

(5) There must be some supernatural facts.

This, after all, is essentially what Craig is trying to say, but I’d hardly call any of this argument’s premises or its conclusion “repugnant.” Craig’s suggestion that naturalism implies that we’re all worthless is just a bad way of putting that second premise.

As for the repugnance issue, I know of few naturalists who think that it’s a consequence of their view that babies are worthless. And, I think it’s repugnant to think that on the assumption that naturalism is true, babies are worthless.

Well of course they don’t. (After all, it’d be “repugnant” of them to think such a thing.) But there are plenty of philosophers – both naturalists and non-naturalists alike – who think that moral facts of the sort that realists posit just cannot be accounted for on a strictly naturalistic metaphysics. And if they’re right, then for as long as one assumes that naturalism is the way to go, there just isn’t a fact about the moral value of babies (regardless of whether or not people still feel compelled to care for them, etc.). Again, Craig’s statements about the “objective worthlessness” of people on naturalism are really just his (rather uninspiring) contribution to the naturalism/non-naturalism debate among moral realists.

The question that Craig is trying to get at is not whether or not people would still value babies if we were to all find out that naturalism is true. I’m sure Craig would agree that of course we’d continue to love and care for our fellow human beings. The issue, rather, is whether or not there’d be a real fact about whether or not we ought to love and care for our fellow human beings. And this is an issue that doesn’t actually pit theists against non-theists; it pits any non-naturalist against naturalists (at least, among moral realists).

If you ignore Craig’s somewhat offensive language, I really think it just comes back to this rather popular debate among meta-ethicists.

Anyway, here’s what I had in mind when I said that Craig was committing the supernaturalistic fallacy. It was the fallacy of assuming without any apparent reason to do so that something that couldn’t be true on the assumption of naturalism would be true on the assumption of theism. . . . (It’s not a fallacy to say that everlasting life requires theism because it makes sense why everlasting life isn’t possible on naturalism but is on theism.)

It’s still not clear to me where the fallacy is, especially now that you’ve added this bit about it “making sense” to think that everlasting life is not possible on naturalism but is on theism. After all, it “makes sense” to some people why robust moral truths aren’t possible on naturalism but are on theism; it doesn’t “make sense” to you and many others. But I don’t see how that’s enough to call something a fallacy.

And I hardly see how Craig is assuming that value is possible on theism “without any apparent reason.” My sense is that there is a rather substantial body of philosophical/theological literature out there explaining how it is that God is (or could be) the source of morality. Craig’s position isn’t exactly unprecedented. He may not delve into this issue in that particular article to the extent that you’d have preferred, but so what?

Anyway, that’s how I see things. Thanks again for your comments.

[By the way, I’m reading and re-reading “The Myth of the False, Justified Belief.” I hope to think up some sort of intelligent reply in the near future. It’s a really neat paper.]

I do find Craig’s position to be repugnant. I do NOT think that his position is accepted by most theists. I know of very few theists who feel compelled to say that if naturalism were true, we’d be worthless. Most theists I know would say that a child produced by purely natural forces would be as deserving as love as a child produced by the hand of God. Most theists I know (apart from those who went to Biola and studied under Craig) seem to share Geach’s attitude (a theist whose work I have the utmost respect for). In his exceptionally dismissive review of Quinn’s Divine Commands and Moral Requirements (here) he wrote that he could think of no important thinker who has ever existed who has held the view that a moral requirement not to perform an act would not depend upon the inherent characteristics of the act but instead upon some divine command. When he dismisses Quinn’s discussion as being “an astronomical distance away from serious Christian theology”, I can only imagine that he’d have even more contempt for Craig’s discussions on the matter. My beef isn’t with theism. I’m an atheist, for the record, but I have respect for the work of many theists. The particular piece I read seemed more like propaganda than serious work so I thought I’d call him on it.

As for the repugnance issue, I know of few naturalists who think that it’s a consequence of their view that babies are worthless. And, I think it’s repugnant to think that on the assumption that naturalism is true, babies are worthless. I don’t think it’s enough to say that Craig’s attitudes are as they should be that he thinks that babies are worthwhile because in addition to their needs, sensitivities, and the like they’re also loved by the Gods. Surely babies are loved by the Gods because they have characteristics that make them lovable. I don’t see that Craig acknowledges that, and that’s scary.

I don’t care that Craig doesn’t mention Kant or Plato, by the way. What a weird criticism that would be. Here’s what I object to in Craig’s work. He knows that Plato, Kant, and Mill have the resources to address the “arguments” he’s offering and yet he’s passing off his arguments as if they can be reasonably assumed to have something going for them. It’s irresponsible work.

Anyway, here’s what I had in mind when I said that Craig was committing the supernaturalistic fallacy. It was the fallacy of assuming without any apparent reason to do so that something that couldn’t be true on the assumption of naturalism would be true on the assumption of theism. I don’t know how anyone missed this, but I thought the context would have made it clear that I didn’t want to say that those who commit the fallacy think that anything that can’t be true on naturalism could be true on theism. It was that it made little sense to say that value and duty couldn’t exist if naturalism were true but could unproblematically be assumed if theism were true. (It’s not a fallacy to say that everlasting life requires theism because it makes sense why everlasting life isn’t possible on naturalism but is on theism.)

As for those authors you mention who say that naturalism is in tension with moral realism, I guess I’d say that I doubt they tink that theism provides a solution to problems generated by naturalism. I suspect that while they believe value and duty is a kind of myth, they will try to make sense of a kind of rational commitment to duty and value. And, I suspect that they’re doing their work in the proper academic spirit and not with the motive of hoodwinking people who don’t know better into thinking there’s something seriously wrong with atheists and agnostics.